**Answers to**

**Back-of-Chapter**

**Even-Numbered Problems**

**Chapter 1**

2. i) **Multinational Production and Pricing.** The global automobile company needs information on demand (how many vehicles can be sold in each market at different prices) and production costs.

ii) **Market Entry.** Barnes and Noble and Borders not only need information on local market demand, they also need information on the ability and willingness of the other company to compete. This means gathering information on the rival's cost structure, sources of supply, access to capital, etc.

iii) **Building a New Bridge.** The authority should estimate usage of the bridge over its useful life, the likely cost of building and maintaining the bridge, and other important side-effects, pro and con -- including positive effects on business activity and the impacts on air pollution and traffic congestion.

iv) **A Regulatory Problem.** Before deciding whether to promote the oil-to-coal conversion, government regulators need information on how much oil would be saved (and the dollar value of savings) and the cost of the chain of side-effects -- not only the direct cost of electricity provision but also pollution costs and environmental damage.

v) **Oil Exploration**. Some of the information BP needs – such as current oil prices, rig worker wages, and other operating costs – is readily available. Other information—such as data gleaned from geological surveys, seismic tests, safety audits; wear and tear on drilling components; short-term and long-term weather conditions; the outlook concerning the global demand for oil – is probabilistic in nature.

vi) **An R&D Decision.** The pharmaceutical company should quiz its scientists on the chances of success (and the timetable for completion) for each R&D approach. The company's marketing department would supply estimates of possible revenues from the drug; its production department would estimate possible costs.

vii) **David Letterman.** Dave must carefully assess what he wants from a new contract (in particular how much he values the earlier time slot). As the negotiations unfold, Dave will glean valuable information as to the current competing offers of CBS and NBC. Of course, Dave must also try to assess how far the two networks might be willing to go in sweetening their offers.

4. Decision vignettes

a. A couple who buy the first house they view have probably sampled too few houses. Housing markets are notoriously imperfect. Houses come in various shapes, sizes, conditions, neighborhoods, and prices. Personal preferences for houses also vary enormously. The couple is likely to get a "better" house for themselves if they view a dozen, two dozen, or more houses over the course of time before buying their "most-preferred" house from the lot. Circumstances justifying the first-house purchase include: (1) the house is so good that viewing others is a waste of time, (2) the house is so good and the commitment must be made now or another buyer will claim the house, (3) the couple must buy now (a job transfer has brought them to the area and schools open tomorrow), (4) they already have full information about the types of other houses available (the wife's best friend is a real estate agent).

b. The company seems to be launching the product to avoid "wasting" the $6 million already spent in development. This "sunk" cost is irrelevant and should be ignored. What does matter for the reinvestment decision are the future revenues and costs of continuing. (Reinvest if the net present value of future profits is positive.) Some "close-to-home" examples of the sunk cost fallacy: i) A fellow pays $250 for a year-long tennis membership but develops severe tennis elbow after two months. He continues to play in great pain in order to get his money's worth. ii) Ms. K has a subscription to a series of six plays for $150. She braves a snow storm so as not to waste the $25 cost. On reflection, she admits that she wouldn't have gone had she been given the ticket for free.

c. It's in the individual motorist's best interest to drive on. (Stopping is risky and inconvenient). But it's in the collective interest of all the delayed motorists to have someone stop and move the mattress. Here's an example of the potential conflict between private and public interests (between private profit and social welfare). In such circumstances, there is a potential role for government intervention.

d. Allowing the use of thalidomide had a disastrous outcome and more importantly was a bad decision (besides its potential risk, the drug was of questionable benefit in aiding sleep). The thalidomide disaster prompted a much tougher stance toward prior drug testing in the U.S. and elsewhere.

e. The frantic couple should choose separate lines to take advantage of whichever line is quicker. Whoever gets served first should check the baggage. The lesson here: DIVERSIFY.

f. To the extent that his actions and behavior were responsible for his marriage breakup, the CEO’s mistake was to lose sight of the most important objective.

g. The cost per life saved is $400,000/20 = $20,000 for the ambulance service. It is $1,200,000/40 = $30,000 for the highway program. Based on these *average* measures, its seems strange that the ambulance budget is being cut and the highway budget expanded. However, the real issue is the impact on lives saved from budget changes *at the margin.* Perhaps, the ambulance budget has a lot of administrative "fat" in it. It could be cut by 40% with very little impact on lives. By the same token, a modest budget increase for highways might have a large impact on additional lives saved. In short, the average cost per life may not tell the real story.

h. FEMA’s prediction of the potential hurricane risk to New Orleans was timely and prescient. However, the warning was not emphasized by the agency and certainly not heeded by federal, state, or local policy makers. The decision error was a combination of inattention, wishful thinking, and denial.

i. According to the counts of pros and cons, the individual prefers: Home over Beach, Beach over Mountains, *but* Mountains over Home. We have a cycle (i.e. intransitive preferences). The individual is left going around in circles. The obvious way out of this dilemma is to "score" each alternative by weighting the individual attributes. The more important the attribute, then the greater is the weight. In addition, the individual could use a broader scale (1 to 10) for each attribute as a way of measuring relative strength of

preferences between alternatives. (For a related example, see Problem 4.4. In this context, the instructor may also wish to discuss voting cycles and the Condorcet paradox).

j. Compared to these extreme outcomes (abject surrender to terrorism or being a global policeman) any option looks good. This is hardly an even-handed portrayal. The real question is whether the implementing increased security measures that sacrifice civil liberties is better than other *relevant* alternatives.

**Chapter 2**

2. The revenue function is R = 170Q - 20Q2. Maximizing revenue means setting marginal revenue equal to zero. Marginal revenue is: MR = dR/dQ = 170 - 40Q. Setting 170 - 40Q = 0 implies Q = 4.25 lots. By contrast, profit is maximized by expanding output only to Q = 3.3 lots. Although the firm can increase its revenue by expanding output from 3.3 to 4.5 lots, it sacrifices profit by doing so (since the extra revenue gained falls short of the extra cost incurred.)

4. a. π = PQ – C = (120 - .5Q)Q - (420 + 60Q + Q2) = -420 + 60Q - 1.5Q2. Therefore, Mπ = dπ /dQ = 60 - 3Q = 0. Solving yields Q\* = 20. Alternatively, R = PQ =

(120 - .5Q)Q = 120Q - .5Q2. Therefore, MR = 120 – Q. In turn, C = -420 + 60Q + Q2, implying: MC = 60 + 2Q. Equating marginal revenue and marginal cost yields: 120 - Q = 60 + 2Q, or Q\* = 20.

b. Here, R = 120Q; it follows that MR = 120. Equating MR and MC yields: 120 = 60 + 2Q, or Q\* = 30.

6. a. If DVDs are given away (P = $0), demand is predicted to be: Q = 1600 - (200)(0) = 1,600 units. At this output, firm A’s cost is: 1,200 + (2)(1,600) =$4,400, and firm B’s cost is: (4)(1,600) = $6,400. Firm A is the cheaper option and should be chosen. (In fact, firm A is cheaper as long as Q > 600.)

b. To maximize profit, we simply set MR = MC for each supplier and compare the maximum profit attainable from each. We know that MR = 8 - Q/100 and the marginal costs are MCA = 2 and MCB = 4. Thus, for firm A, we find: 8 - QA/100 = 2, and so QA = 600 and PA = $5 (from the price equation). For firm B, we find QB = 400 and PB = $6. With Firm A, the station’s profit is: 3,000 - [1,200 + (2)(600)] = $600. With Firm B, its profit is 2,400 - 1,600 = $800. Thus, an order of 400 DVDs from firm B (priced at $6 each) is optimal.

8. The fall in revenue from waiting each additional month is MR = dR/dt = -8. The reduction in cost of a month’s delay is MC = dC/dt = -20 + .5t. The optimal introduction date is found by equating MR and MC: -8 = -20 + .5t, which implies .5t = 12 or t\* = 24 months. The marketing manager’s 12-month target is too early. Delaying 12 more months sacrifices revenue but more than compensates in reduced costs.

10. The latter view is correct. The additional post-sale revenues increase MR, effectively shifting the MR curve up and to the right. The new intersection of MR and MC occurs at a higher output, which, in turn, implies a cut in price. (Of course, one must discount the additional profit from service and supplies to take into account the time value of money.)

12. a. First note that if marginal cost and marginal benefit to consumers both increased by $25, the optimal output would not change since MR(Q\*) = MC(Q\*) implies that MR(Q\*) + 25 = MC(Q\*) + 25. The price would rise by $25 but, since marginal costs rise by $25, the firm’s total profits would remain the same. If marginal costs increased by more than $25, profits would fall. Thus the firm should not redesign when the increase in MC is $30.

b. If MC increases by $15 and MR increases by $25, the new intersection of the MR and MC occurs at a greater output. Output, price, and profit would all rise. Price, however, would rise by less than $25.

\*14. The Burger Queen (BQ) facts are P = 3 - Q/800 and MC = $.80.

a. Set MR = 0 to find BQ’s revenue-maximizing Q and P. Thus, we have 3 - Q/400 = 0, so Q = 1,200 and P = $1.50. Total revenue is $1,800 and BQ’s share is 20% or $360. The franchise owner’s revenue is $1,440, its costs are (.8)(1,200) = $960, so its profit is $480.

b. The franchise owner maximizes its profit by setting MR = MC. Note that the relevant MR is (.8)(3 - Q/400) = 2.4 - Q/500. After setting MR = .80, we find Q = 800. In turn, P = $2.00 and the parties’ total profit is (2.00 - .80)(800) = $960, which is considerably larger than $840, the total profit in part (a).

c. Regardless of the exact split, both parties have an interest in maximizing total profit, and this is done by setting (full) MR equal to MC. Thus, we have 3 - Q/400 = .80, so that Q = 880. In turn, P = $1.90, and total profit is: (1.90 - .80)(880) = $968.

d. The chief disadvantage of profit sharing is that it is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for the parent company to *monitor* the reported profits of the numerous franchises. Revenue is relatively easy to check (from the cash register receipts) but costs are another matter. Individual franchisees have an incentive to exaggerate the costs they report in order to lower the measured profits from which the parent’s split is determined. The difficulty in monitoring cost and profit is the main strike against profit sharing.