

SOLUTIONS MANUAL
COMPUTER SECURITY
THIRD EDITION

CHAPTERS 1–12

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NOTICE

This manual contains solutions to the review questions and homework problems in *Computer Security, Third Edition*. If you spot an error in a solution or in the wording of a problem, I would greatly appreciate it if you would forward the information via email to wllmst@me.net. An errata sheet for this manual, if needed, is available at <http://www.box.net/shared/ds8lygu0tjljokf98k85> . File name is **S-CompSec3e-mmyy.**

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CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

- 1.1** Computer security refers to protection afforded to an automated information system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information system resources (includes hardware, software, firmware, information/data, and telecommunications).
- 1.2** Passive threats have to do with eavesdropping on, or monitoring, transmissions. Electronic mail, file transfers, and client/server exchanges are examples of transmissions that can be monitored. Active threats include the modification of transmitted data and attempts to gain unauthorized access to computer systems.
- 1.3** Passive attacks: release of message contents and traffic analysis. Active attacks: masquerade, replay, modification of messages, and denial of service.
- 1.4 Authentication:** The assurance that the communicating entity is the one that it claims to be.
- Access control:** The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource (i.e., this service controls who can have access to a resource, under what conditions access can occur, and what those accessing the resource are allowed to do).
- Data confidentiality:** The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.
- Data integrity:** The assurance that data received are exactly as sent by an authorized entity (i.e., contain no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay).
- Nonrepudiation:** Provides protection against denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication.
- Availability service:** The property of a system or a system resource being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized system entity, according to performance specifications for the system (i.e., a system is available if it provides services according to the system design whenever users request them).

- 1.5** An attack surface consists of the reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities in a system. An attack tree is a branching, hierarchical data structure that represents a set of potential techniques for exploiting security vulnerabilities.

ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS

- 1.1** The system must keep personal identification numbers confidential, both in the host system and during transmission for a transaction. It must protect the integrity of account records and of individual transactions. Availability of the host system is important to the economic well being of the bank, but not to its fiduciary responsibility. The availability of individual teller machines is of less concern. Example from [NRC91].
- 1.2** The system does not have high requirements for integrity on individual transactions, as lasting damage will not be incurred by occasionally losing a call or billing record. The integrity of control programs and configuration records, however, is critical. Without these, the switching function would be defeated and the most important attribute of all - availability - would be compromised. A telephone switching system must also preserve the confidentiality of individual calls, preventing one caller from overhearing another. Example from [NRC91].
- 1.3**
- a.** The system will have to assure confidentiality if it is being used to publish corporate proprietary material.
 - b.** The system will have to assure integrity if it is being used to laws or regulations.
 - c.** The system will have to assure availability if it is being used to publish a daily paper. Example from [NRC91].
- 1.4**
- a.** An organization managing public information on its web server determines that there is no potential impact from a loss of confidentiality (i.e., confidentiality requirements are not applicable), a moderate potential impact from a loss of integrity, and a moderate potential impact from a loss of availability.
 - b.** A law enforcement organization managing extremely sensitive investigative information determines that the potential impact from a loss of confidentiality is high, the potential impact from a loss of integrity is moderate, and the potential impact from a loss of availability is moderate.
 - c.** A financial organization managing routine administrative information (not privacy-related information) determines that the potential impact from a loss of confidentiality is low, the potential impact from a loss of integrity is low, and the potential impact from a loss of availability is low.

- d.** The management within the contracting organization determines that: (i) for the sensitive contract information, the potential impact from a loss of confidentiality is moderate, the potential impact from a loss of integrity is moderate, and the potential impact from a loss of availability is low; and (ii) for the routine administrative information (non-privacy-related information), the potential impact from a loss of confidentiality is low, the potential impact from a loss of integrity is low, and the potential impact from a loss of availability is low.
- e.** The management at the power plant determines that: (i) for the sensor data being acquired by the SCADA system, there is no potential impact from a loss of confidentiality, a high potential impact from a loss of integrity, and a high potential impact from a loss of availability; and (ii) for the administrative information being processed by the system, there is a low potential impact from a loss of confidentiality, a low potential impact from a loss of integrity, and a low potential impact from a loss of availability. Examples from FIPS 199.

1.5 a. At first glance, this code looks fine, but what happens if `IsAccessAllowed` fails? For example, what happens if the system runs out of memory, or object handles, when this function is called? The user can execute the privileged task because the function might return an error such as `ERROR NOT ENOUGH MEMORY`.

b. X


```

DWORD dwRet = IsAccessAllowed(...);
if (dwRet == NO_ERROR) {
    // Secure check OK.
    // Perform task.
} else {
    // Security check failed.
    // Inform user that access is denied.
}

```

In this case, if the call to `IsAccessAllowed` fails for any reason, the user is denied access to the privileged operation.

1.6



1.7 We present the tree in text form; call the company X:

Survivability Compromise: Disclosure of X proprietary secrets

- OR 1. Physically scavenge discarded items from X
 - OR 1. Inspect dumpster content on-site
 - 2. Inspect refuse after removal from site
- 2. Monitor emanations from X machines
 - AND 1. Survey physical perimeter to determine optimal monitoring position
 - 2. Acquire necessary monitoring equipment
 - 3. Setup monitoring site
 - 4. Monitor emanations from site
- 3. Recruit help of trusted X insider
 - OR 1. Plant spy as trusted insider
 - 2. Use existing trusted insider
- 4. Physically access X networks or machines
 - OR 1. Get physical, on-site access to Intranet
 - 2. Get physical access to external machines
- 5. Attack X intranet using its connections with Internet
 - OR 1. Monitor communications over Internet for leakage
 - 2. Get trusted process to send sensitive information to attacker over Internet
 - 3. Gain privileged access to Web server
- 6. Attack X intranet using its connections with public telephone network (PTN)
 - OR 1. Monitor communications over PTN for leakage of sensitive information
 - 2. Gain privileged access to machines on intranet connected via Internet

CHAPTER 2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

- 2.1** Plaintext, encryption algorithm, secret key, ciphertext, decryption algorithm.
- 2.2** One secret key.
- 2.3** (1) a strong encryption algorithm; (2) Sender and receiver must have obtained copies of the secret key in a secure fashion and must keep the key secure.
- 2.4** Message encryption, message authentication code, hash function.
- 2.5** An authenticator that is a cryptographic function of both the data to be authenticated and a secret key.
- 2.6** **(a)** A hash code is computed from the source message, encrypted using symmetric encryption and a secret key, and appended to the message. At the receiver, the same hash code is computed. The incoming code is decrypted using the same key and compared with the computed hash code. **(b)** This is the same procedure as in (a) except that public-key encryption is used; the sender encrypts the hash code with the sender's private key, and the receiver decrypts the hash code with the sender's public key. **(c)** A secret value is appended to a message and then a hash code is calculated using the message plus secret value as input. Then the message (without the secret value) and the hash code are transmitted. The receiver appends the same secret value to the message and computes the hash value over the message plus secret value. This is then compared to the received hash code.
- 2.7**
- 1.** H can be applied to a block of data of any size.
 - 2.** H produces a fixed-length output.
 - 3.** $H(x)$ is relatively easy to compute for any given x , making both hardware and software implementations practical.
 - 4.** For any given value h , it is computationally infeasible to find x such that $H(x) = h$.
 - 5.** For any given block x , it is computationally infeasible to find $y \neq x$ with $H(y) = H(x)$.

6. It is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x, y) such that $H(x) = H(y)$.

2.8 Plaintext: This is the readable message or data that is fed into the algorithm as input. **Encryption algorithm:** The encryption algorithm performs various transformations on the plaintext. **Public and private keys:** This is a pair of keys that have been selected so that if one is used for encryption, the other is used for decryption. The exact transformations performed by the encryption algorithm depend on the public or private key that is provided as input. **Ciphertext:** This is the scrambled message produced as output. It depends on the plaintext and the key. For a given message, two different keys will produce two different ciphertexts. **Decryption algorithm:** This algorithm accepts the ciphertext and the matching key and produces the original plaintext.

2.9 Encryption/decryption: The sender encrypts a message with the recipient's public key. **Digital signature:** The sender "signs" a message with its private key. Signing is achieved by a cryptographic algorithm applied to the message or to a small block of data that is a function of the message. **Key exchange:** Two sides cooperate to exchange a session key. Several different approaches are possible, involving the private key(s) of one or both parties.

2.10 The key used in conventional encryption is typically referred to as a **secret key**. The two keys used for public-key encryption are referred to as the **public key** and the **private key**.

2.11 A **digital signature** is an authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a message to attach a code that acts as a signature. The signature is formed by taking the hash of the message and encrypting the message with the creator's private key. The signature guarantees the source and integrity of the message.

2.12 A **public-key certificate** consists of a public key plus a User ID of the key owner, with the whole block signed by a trusted third party. Typically, the third party is a certificate authority (CA) that is trusted by the user community, such as a government agency or a financial institution.

2.13 Several different approaches are possible, involving the private key(s) of one or both parties. One approach is Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Another approach is for the sender to encrypt a secret key with the recipient's public key.

ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS

2.1 Yes. The eavesdropper is left with two strings, one sent in each direction, and their XOR is the secret key.

2.2 a.

	2	8	10	7	9	6	3	1	4	5
C	R	Y	P	T	O	G	A	H	I	
B	E	A	T	T	H	E	T	H	I	
R	D	P	I	L	L	A	R	F	R	
O	M	T	H	E	L	E	F	T	O	
U	T	S	I	D	E	T	H	E	L	
Y	C	E	U	M	T	H	E	A	T	
R	E	T	O	N	I	G	H	T	A	
T	S	E	V	E	N	I	F	Y	O	
U	A	R	E	D	I	S	T	R	U	
S	T	F	U	L	B	R	I	N	G	
T	W	O	F	R	I	E	N	D	S	

	4	2	8	10	5	6	3	7	1	9
N	E	T	W	O	R	K	S	C	U	
T	R	F	H	E	H	F	T	I	N	
B	R	O	U	Y	R	T	U	S	T	
E	A	E	T	H	G	I	S	R	E	
H	F	T	E	A	T	Y	R	N	D	
I	R	O	L	T	A	O	U	G	S	
H	L	L	E	T	I	N	I	B	I	
T	I	H	I	U	O	V	E	U	F	
E	D	M	T	C	E	S	A	T	W	
T	L	E	D	M	N	E	D	L	R	
A	P	T	S	E	T	E	R	F	O	

ISRNG BUTLF RRAFR LIDL P FTIYO NVSEE TBEHI HTETA
 EYHAT TUCME HRGTA IOENT TUSRU IEADR FOETO LHMET
 NTEDS IFWRO HUTEL EITDS

- b.** The two matrices are used in reverse order. First, the ciphertext is laid out in columns in the second matrix, taking into account the order dictated by the second memory word. Then, the contents of the second matrix are read left to right, top to bottom and laid out in columns in the first matrix, taking into account the order dictated by the first memory word. The plaintext is then read left to right, top to bottom.
- c.** Although this is a weak method, it may have use with time-sensitive information and an adversary without immediate access to good cryptanalysis (e.g., tactical use). Plus it doesn't require anything more than paper and pencil, and can be easily remembered.

2.3 a. Let $-X$ be the additive inverse of X . That is $-X \oplus X = 0$. Then:

$$P = (C \oplus -K_1) \oplus K_0$$


b. First, calculate $-C'$. Then $-C' = (P' \oplus K_0) \oplus (-K_1)$. We then have:

$$C \oplus -C' = (P \oplus K_0) \oplus (P' \oplus K_0)$$

However, the operations \oplus and \oplus are not associative or distributive with one another, so it is not possible to solve this equation for K_0 .

2.4 a. The constants ensure that encryption/decryption in each round is different.

b. First two rounds:



c. First, let's define the encryption process:


$$L_2 = L_0 \oplus [(R_0 \ll 4) \oplus K_0] \oplus [R_0 \oplus \delta_1] \oplus [(R_0 \gg 5) \oplus K_1]$$

$$R_2 = R_0 \oplus [(L_2 \ll 4) \oplus K_2] \oplus [L_2 \oplus \delta_2] \oplus [(L_2 \gg 5) \oplus K_3]$$

Now the decryption process. The input is the ciphertext (L_2, R_2) , and the output is the plaintext (L_0, R_0) . Decryption is essentially the same as encryption, with the subkeys and delta values applied in reverse order. Also note that it is not necessary to use subtraction because there is an even number of additions in each equation.

$$R_0 = R_2 \oplus [(L_2 \ll 4) \oplus K_2] \oplus [L_2 \oplus \delta_2] \oplus [(L_2 \gg 5) \oplus K_3]$$

$$L_0 = L_2 \oplus [(R_0 \ll 4) \oplus K_0] \oplus [R_0 \oplus \delta_1] \oplus [(R_0 \gg 5) \oplus K_1]$$




- 2.5 a.** Will be detected with both (i) DS and (ii) MAC.
b. Won't be detected by either (Remark: use timestamps).
c. (i) DS: Bob simply has to verify the message with the public key from both. Obviously, only Alice's public key results in a successful verification.


- (ii) MAC: Bob has to challenge both, Oscar and Bob, to reveal their secret key to him (which he knows anyway). Only Bob can do that.
- d.** (i) DS: Alice has to force Bob to prove his claim by sending her a copy of the message in question with the signature. Then Alice can show that message and signature can be verified with Bob's public key) Bob must have generated the message.
- (ii) MAC: No, Bob can claim that Alice generated this message.

2.6 The statement is false. Such a function cannot be one-to-one because the number of inputs to the function is of arbitrary, but the number of unique outputs is 2^n . Thus, there are multiple inputs that map into the same output.

2.7 a. Overall structure:



Compression function F:



b. BFQG

c. Simple algebra is all you need to generate a result:

AYHGDAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA


2.8

a. $M3 =$

5	2	1	4	5
1	4	3	2	2
3	1	2	5	3
4	3	4	1	4
2	5	5	3	1

- b. Assume a plaintext message p is to be encrypted by Alice and sent to Bob. Bob makes use of $M1$ and $M3$, and Alice makes use of $M2$. Bob chooses a random number, k , as his private key, and maps k by $M1$ to get x , which he sends as his public key to Alice. Alice uses x to encrypt p with $M2$ to get z , the ciphertext, which she sends to Bob. Bob uses k to decrypt z by means of $M3$, yielding the plaintext message p .
- c. If the numbers are large enough, and $M1$ and $M2$ are sufficiently random to make it impractical to work backwards, p cannot be found without knowing k .

2.9 We show the creation of a digital envelope:



CHAPTER 3 USER AUTHENTICATION

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

3.1 Something the individual knows: Examples include a password, a personal identification number (PIN), or answers to a prearranged set of questions.

Something the individual possesses: Examples include electronic keycards, smart cards, and physical keys. This type of authenticator is referred to as a token.

Something the individual is (static biometrics): Examples include recognition by fingerprint, retina, and face.

Something the individual does (dynamic biometrics): Examples include recognition by voice pattern, handwriting characteristics, and typing rhythm.

3.2 We can identify the following attack strategies and countermeasures:

Offline dictionary attack: Typically, strong access controls are used to protect the system's password file. However, experience shows that determined hackers can frequently bypass such controls and gain access to the file. The attacker obtains the system password file and compares the password hashes against hashes of commonly used passwords. If a match is found, the attacker can gain access by that ID/password combination.

Specific account attack: The attacker targets a specific account and submits password guesses until the correct password is discovered.

Popular password attack: A variation of the preceding attack is to use a popular password and try it against a wide range of user IDs. A user's tendency is to choose a password that is easily remembered; this unfortunately makes the password easy to guess.

Password guessing against single user: The attacker attempts to gain knowledge about the account holder and system password policies and uses that knowledge to guess the password.

Workstation hijacking: The attacker waits until a logged-in workstation is unattended.

Exploiting user mistakes: If the system assigns a password, then the user is more likely to write it down because it is difficult to remember. This situation creates the potential for an adversary to read the written password. A user may intentionally share a password, to enable a colleague to share files, for example. Also, attackers are frequently

successful in obtaining passwords by using social engineering tactics that trick the user or an account manager into revealing a password. Many computer systems are shipped with preconfigured passwords for system administrators. Unless these preconfigured passwords are changed, they are easily guessed.

Exploiting multiple password use. Attacks can also become much more effective or damaging if different network devices share the same or a similar password for a given user.

Electronic monitoring: If a password is communicated across a network to log on to a remote system, it is vulnerable to eavesdropping. Simple encryption will not fix this problem, because the encrypted password is, in effect, the password and can be observed and reused by an adversary.

3.3 One technique is to restrict access to the password file using standard access control measures. Another technique is to force users to select passwords that are difficult to guess.

3.4 User education: Users can be told the importance of using hard-to-guess passwords and can be provided with guidelines for selecting strong passwords.

Computer-generated passwords: the system selects a password for the user.

Reactive password checking: the system periodically runs its own password cracker to find guessable passwords.

Proactive password checking: a user is allowed to select his or her own password. However, at the time of selection, the system checks to see if the password is allowable and, if not, rejects it.

3.5 Memory cards can store but not process data. Smart cards have a microprocessor.

3.6 Facial characteristics: Facial characteristics are the most common means of human-to-human identification; thus it is natural to consider them for identification by computer. The most common approach is to define characteristics based on relative location and shape of key facial features, such as eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips, and chin shape. An alternative approach is to use an infrared camera to produce a face thermogram that correlates with the underlying vascular system in the human face.

Fingerprints: Fingerprints have been used as a means of identification for centuries, and the process has been systematized and automated particularly for law enforcement purposes. A fingerprint is the pattern of ridges and furrows on the surface of the fingertip. Fingerprints are believed to be unique across the entire human population. In practice, automated fingerprint recognition and matching system extract a